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BEWNIRE OF THE I)ARI SIDE OF THE FAWCE
By Keith A. Rowley
In Berry v. Gulf Coast Wings Inc.,' a
case that has garnered an unusual amount
of attention in both the legal and popular
press for what seems to be a simple
contract dispute,2 a former Hooters
waitress, Jodee Berry, is suing her former
employer for breaching its promise to
award a new Toyota to the winner of an
April 2001 contest. Berry alleges that her
manager, Jared Blair, told Berry and the
other waitresses at the Panama City,
Florida Hooters that whoever sold the
most beer at each participating Hooters
locations during April 2001 would be
entered in a drawing, and that the winner
of the drawing would receive a new
Toyota.
As the contest progressed, Berry
alleges that Blair told the waitresses that
he did not know whether the winner
would receive a Toyota car, truck, or van,
but that the winner would have to pay any
registration fees on the vehicle. In early
May, Blair informed Berry that she had
won the contest, and proceeded to
blindfold her and lead her to the parking
lot outside the restaurant. Waiting for her
there was not a Toyota car, truck, or van,
but a doll of the character Yoda from the
Star Wars movies - a "toy Yoda." Clever,
eh? Blair was laughing. Berry was not.
Berry sued for breach of contract and
fraud. As I tell my students from time to
time, I teach Contracts, not Torts, so I
want to focus on the contract issues and,
more specifically, on the viability of one of
the defenses advanced by Hooters: It was a
joke.3
The Lessons of Lucy and Leonard
The case best known to most lawyers
and judges in which a party attempted to
avoid contractual liability on the basis that
it was only kidding when it made the
alleged promise or formed the alleged
contract is Lucy v. Zehmer.4 Lucy had been
trying to purchase Ferguson Farm from the
Zehmers for years. One evening, over
drinks, Lucy offered to buy the farm from
the Zehmers for $50,000 ($30,000 more
than Mr. Zehmer had once verbally agreed
to take for the farm before backing out of
the deal). After a fairly lengthy discussion,
Mr. Zehmer wrote the following on the
back of a restaurant receipt: "We do hereby
agree to sell to W.O. Lucy the Ferguson
Farm complete for $50,000 title
satisfactory to buyer." Both Mr. and Mrs.
Zehmer signed the writing, and then Mr.
Zehmer gave it to Lucy.5 A couple of
weeks later, when Lucy informed Mr.
Zehmer that he had the $50,000 in cash
and was ready to close, Mr. Zehmer replied
that he never intended to sell the farm to
Lucy.6
In their answer to Lucy's suit for
breach of contract, the Zehmers argued,
inter alia, that Mr. Zehmer had agreed to
sell the farm to Lucy only "in jest," and
that Lucy knew perfectly well that Zehmer
was planning on keeping the farm for his
son.7 Reversing the trial court, the
Virginia Supreme Court characterized the
Zehmers' defense as "unusual, if not
bizarre, ... [w]hen made to the writing
admittedly prepared by one of the
defendants and signed by both."s The
court then found that (1) the extent and
nature of the parties' discussions prior to
the execution of the writing, (2) Mr.
Zehmer's acquiescence to Lucy's insistence
that Mr. Zehmer change the wording of
the writing and that Mrs. Zehmer also sign
it, (3) the fact that both Mr. and Mrs.
Zehmer separately signed the writing, and
(4) the Zehmers allowed Lucy to leave
with the signed writing without any
suggestion that they did not intend to be
bound by it "fumish[ed] persuasive
evidence that the execution of the
contract was a serious business transaction
rather than a casual, jesting matter."9
Moreover, and more particularly
relevant to the parties in Berry, the court
also found that, even if Mr. Zehmer
thought the agreement was a joke, "Lucy
did not so understand it but considered it
to be a serious business transaction and the
contract to be binding on the Zehmers as
well as on himself." 10 Expressing what has
come to be known as the "objective
manifestation of assent" test," the court
held:
[T]he law imputes to a person an
intention corresponding to the
reasonable meaning of his words and
acts.... Therefore, a person cannot set
up that he was merely jesting when
his conduct and words would warrant
a reasonable person in believing that
he intended a real agreement.
Whether the writing signed by the
defendants and now sought to be
enforced by the complainants was the
result of a serious offer by Lucy and a
serious acceptance by the defendants,
or was a serious offer by Lucy and an
acceptance in secret jest by the
defendants, in either event it
constituted a binding contract of sale
between the parties.12
A more recent case of note is Leonard
v. Pepsico, Inc.13 Pepsi ran a series of TV
advertisements with the common theme
"Drink Pepsi, Get Stuff' in conjunction
with a "Pepsi Stuff' catalog that included a
variety of items that could be purchased
using "Pepsi Points."' 4 One such
advertisement featured, along with more
mundane items (a t-shirt, a leather jacket,
and sunglasses), a Harrier fighter jet.
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Displayed across the bottom of the TV
screen was "HARRIER FIGHTER
7,000,000 PEPSI POINTS."'5
Leonard consulted the Pepsi Stuff
catalog. He did not find the Harrier jet
listed. He did find that he could purchase
Pepsi Points for 10 cents each and that he
could order promotional merchandise with
as few as fifteen earned (as opposed to
purchased) Pepsi Points. Leonard
proceeded to raise $700,000 to purchase
7,000,000 Pepsi Points. He then submitted
an order form, along with 15 earned Pepsi
Points, and a check for $700,008.50.16
Through an exchange of correspondence,
Pepsi refused to process Leonard's order,
arguing that the Harrier jet was included
in the advertisement "to create a
humorous and entertaining ad."17
Leonard sued Pepsi alleging, inter alia,
breach of contract. The district court
granted Pepsi summary judgment because,
inter alia, "no objective person could
reasonably have concluded that the
commercial actually offered consumers a
Harrier jet."18
Starting from the premise that "[a]n
obvious joke ... would not give rise to a
contract," 19 and recognizing the
counterpremise that, "if there is no
indication that the offer is 'evidently in
jest,' and that an objective, reasonable
person would find that the offer was
serious, then there may be a valid offer,"20
the Leonard court explained that "the
obvious absurdity of the commercial"
defeated Leonard's argument that it "was
not clearly in jest."21 Judge Wood based
her conclusion on five factors: (1) the
exaggerated claim "that Pepsi Stuff
merchandise will inject drama and
moment into hitherto unexceptional
lives"; (2) the "high improbability" that a
teenager would be allowed to fly a Harrier
and able to do so under the conditions
depicted; (3) the "exaggerated adolescent
fantasy" depicted; (4) the absurd use of a
combat jet to commute to school; and (5)
the fact that amassing 7,000,000 Pepsi
Points would require drinking "roughly 190
Pepsis a day for the next hundred years" or
raising $700,000 to purchase a
$23,000,000 jet - clearly, "a deal too good
to be true."22
Between the Poles
Lucy and Leonard represent the two
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ends of an enforceability spectrum. On one
end, an offer and acceptance that has all of
the outward manifestations of a serious
contract will be enforced, despite the fact
that one of the parties harbored a secret
intent not to be bound. On the other, a
statement or act that no reasonable person
could understand to be an offer or
acceptance will not give rise to a contract,
despite the fact that one party may have
been in earnest. What of the seemingly
vast middle ground between these two
poles?
The richest vein of reported case law
on the enforceability of agreements made
in jest arises out of sham marriages. The
reported cases generally fall into two
categories: those in which both parties
agree that the marriage was only in jest,2 3
and those in which only one party argues
that the marriage was only in jest.24 In the
former, courts have found no marriage
contract because, in the words of the
leading case, "[mWere words without any
intention corresponding to them will not
make a marriage or any other civil
contract," provided that "both parties
intended and understood that they were
not to have effect."25 In the latter, courts
have refused to invalidate the marriage
contract because, absent a "show[ing] that
both parties intended and understood that
they were not entering into the
matrimonial relation," one party "could
not avoid the marriage by a mental
reservation [or] secret intention not to
become [wed to the other]."26
"Joke" or "sham" contracts in other
contexts have received somewhat less
uniform treatment from the courts. Still,
there is ample authority that, in the
absence of an obviously outlandish act or
statement, like that in Leonard, or a
context that belies the likelihood of
genuine contractual intent, 27 both parties
must have understood the act or statement
to be insincere at the time the alleged
contract was made in order to avoid
forming a contract. 28
The record in Berry is insufficiently
developed to conclude whether the
context in which Blair announced the
contest to Berry and her co-workers belied
his sincerity, whether Berry believed at the
time of Blair's statement that it was a joke,
or whether a disinterested third party
present when Blair made the
announcement would have concluded that
both Blair and the waitresses knew that
Blair's offer was insincere. It does seem safe
to conclude that Blair's statement was not
so obviously outlandish that no reasonable
person could have taken it seriously. A
new Toyota seems like a rather lavish prize
for the waitress selling the most beer in a
month, but then a $20,000 reward to
anyone who could prove that a car dealer
was selling new vehicles for more than $89
over factory invoice seems even more
disproportionate to the effort required to
earn the prize. Yet, in Rosenthal v. Al
Packer Ford, Inc.,29 the reason the plaintiff
failed to prevail was not because the court
found that the offered reward did not give
rise to a contract; but, rather, because the
court found that the offeror did not breach
the contract.30
Parting Shot
Whether Jodee Berry is ultimately
successful against Hooters remains to be
seen. However, she has already survived
summary judgment, which suggests that
Hooters will end up spending substantially
more money defending this lawsuit than it
would have cost them to perform. Our
moral: If you are going to use the farce,
beware of the dark side.
The author is an Associate Professor of Law,
William S. Boyd School of Law, University of
Nevada Las Vegas. He teaches Contracts,
Advanced Contracts, Secured Transactions,
and Economics and the Law, and writes
primarily in the areas of contract law and
securities regulation. He thanks Tabitha
Fiddyment for her research assistance.
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